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OIL AND REFORM A LA MEXICANA
JOHN BAKER*
ABSTRACT
Mexico’s recent Energy Reform sent a shock to upend its seventy-five-year-old petroleum
monopoly, hoping to cure the ailing industry with injections of foreign investment. Mexico
sought to undo a history of state control overnight, but present challenges show that history
cannot be undone so easily. This Note addresses the practical significance of the Reform
within the context of Mexico’s tumultuous oil history. This context aids in defining the cause
and contours of post-Reform challenges to measure future expectations accordingly. The
Reform was a necessary step that required herculean efforts to effectuate; however, future
growth will require sustained efforts. Long-term economic stability depends on Mexico’s
ability to minimize investor uncertainty and provide Pemex with the latitude to make strategic business decisions without the hindrance of political influence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mexico stands as a prime example of the ironic correlation between abundant resources with massive potential and economic instability. Over the past hundred years, Mexico has had a tumultuous
relationship with oil, its chief source of revenue.1 Early successes
brought foreign investment but comparatively inequitable arrangements. Elevated conflict led to the 1938 expropriation of the petroleum industry from foreign investors.2 The aftermath of the expropriation and subsequent poor decisions created enduring losses from
which Mexico is still suffering.3 In a bold move, President Nieto announced a radical liberalization of the industry.4 The remaining question, of course, is whether the reforms will be enough to turn the
page, especially in light of current economic conditions. Mexico projects significant future growth, but will the Reform5 be enough to
overcome Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)’s6 institutional and historical
challenges in the oil industry? The Reform aims to inject foreign investment to heal Mexico’s ailing economy, but it might be too little
too late. Pemex is struggling with record high debt and Mexico’s first
post-Reform bidding round failed to attract much interest.7 Meanwhile, the global oil market remains depressed and recovery is uncertain. The Reform presents the opportunity to reverse declining production and diversify risk to achieve sustainable economic growth;
however, successful implementation requires confronting historical
challenges and adapting to survive amidst new ones.
This Note will analyze the significance of the Reform and future
expectations of implementation. The first two Parts will provide context with a look into Mexico’s history and the recent challenges that
1. Clare Ribando Seelke et al., Cong. Research Serv., R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas
Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United States 1, 18 (2015).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Section III.A.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. For simplicity’s sake, this Note will use “Reform” to refer collectively to President
Nieto’s energy reforms enacted in the Constitutional Reform and Secondary Legislation.
6. Petróleos Mexicanos is Mexico’s state-owned oil and gas company.
7. See infra Part V.
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precipitated reform efforts. Mexico’s last oil revolution left open
wounds, which multiplied the growing pains of implementation. Part
II will analyze the social dynamics and inequities from which Pemex
was born. Early oil agreements brought massive successes but kept
wealth in the hands of foreigners. These inequalities aggravated the
underlying social tensions that fueled the Mexican Revolution. The
Mexican Revolution established a new regime, which attempted to
extract greater benefits from the foreign oil companies for Mexico.
These attempts were met with extreme resistance and tensions rose
until the government enacted the first radical oil reform. The government expropriated the entire industry and established a complete
monopoly
under
the
newly
formed Pemex.8
Pemex was given the enormous task of running the entire oil sector, top to bottom, despite its lack of expertise. Part III will examine
how Pemex handled this massive task and the recent events, which
created the urgent need for reform. In the aftermath of the 1938 expropriation, Mexico was forced into isolation so Pemex could not benefit from new technologies or the expertise of foreign oil companies.9
Mexico relied heavily on Pemex to sustain the economy. Pemex was
expected to run the entire industry with a crippling tax burden and
in an extremely restrictive regulatory environment.10 Pemex ran like
a governmental ministry, and its politically appointed leadership
failed to make strategic, long-term investments. Despite brief periods
of success, these systemic problems have severely inhibited Pemex’s
growth. More recently, declining production and a weak market created an immediate need for change.11
The status quo was no longer an option. In response to these challenges, President Nieto enacted the Reform in hopes of lifting the
Mexican economy. Part IV will examine, in greater detail, the content
and structure of the recent Reform. The Reform puts a swift end to
the state-run monopoly. The key takeaway from the Reform is its
flexibility. The Reform allows for an adaptive approach to generate
revenue. Attracting investors requires a balanced consideration of
risk and reward. Part V will inquire into Mexico’s implementation
efforts in pursuit of attracting investors and improving Pemex. Mexico’s earliest efforts to attract investors were marked by disappointment; however, recent bidding successes show that Mexico’s newly
minted regulatory agencies can adapt to the market effectively.12
Pemex, however, is struggling to adapt. Current economic conditions
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part II.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part V.
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and lingering government control exacerbate Pemex’s challenges.
The stakes could not be much higher, and the short-term prognosis is
bleak, but undue focus on short-term gains is what created the urgency for change in the first place. This Note urges for cautious optimism. The Reform takes on many problems that have historically
hindered growth, but growing pains should be expected. The Reform
gives Pemex and the Ministry of Energy significant flexibility to
make strategic, long-term decisions, and escape the inevitable boom
and bust associated with the old regime’s politically motivated shortterm approach. Despite short-term challenges, improvements and a
refocused Pemex CEO show indications of future economic growth.
Laws can be rewritten overnight, but rewriting history takes longer.
II. PAST TROUBLES
A la Mexicana simply means “the Mexican way.” Mexico’s history
in the oil industry is as unique as it is controversial. Foreign investment sparked Mexico’s meteoric rise to the global forefront of the industry, but Mexico hardly partook in the benefits.13 Inequities aggravated underlying social tensions until revolution consumed the country. Post-revolution reform stripped foreign companies of their rights
and placed full industry control in the hands of the state-run oil company, Pemex. Seventy-five years later, Pemex maintained its monopoly and stood as a symbol of Mexican nationalism and triumph.14
Radical reform has returned to center stage of Mexican history. President Nieto recently broke the monopoly and implemented a host of
liberalizing reforms to once again permit foreign oil industry investment within Mexican borders.15 The “[e]nergy reform is the most important economic change in Mexico in the last 50 years.”16 The recent
reforms, President Nieto’s “signature issue,”17 do more than nudge
Mexico’s petroleum industry towards greater liberalization; they represent a radical departure from the state-run monopoly, finally unlocking the door for competition and foreign investment. This Section

13. JONATHAN C. BROWN, OIL AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO 225 (1993).
14. Energy Reform is the Most Important Structural Change in Mexico in the Past Fifty
Years: EPN, MÉXICO: PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA (quoting President Nieto),
http://en.presidencia.gob.mx/articles-press/energy-reform-is-the-most-important-structuralchange-in-mexico-in-the-past-fifty-years-epn [https://perma.cc/LU43-2PCF] (last updated
Mar. 19, 2014).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez & Adriana Lopez Caraveo, Mexico Oil Opening First
Time Since 1938 Shows Revival: Energy, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2012, 10:32 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-25/mexico-oil-opening-first-time-since1938-shows-revival-energy [https://perma.cc/JZ8J-MUH7].
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will provide the necessary context to understand President Nieto’s
statement and the effect of his administration’s reforms.
Despite abundant resources, Mexico has had a tumultuous history
in the oil market since the discovery of oil at the turn of the twentieth
century.18 At the time, the Mining Laws of 1884 and 1892, enacted
during the Porfirio Díaz regime, formed the legal basis of oil companies’ ownership rights. The laws held that hydrocarbons were the exclusive property of the owner of the soil,19 and that ownership shall
be irrevocable and perpetual.20 These expansive rights were essentially equivalent to fee simple ownership and were markedly stronger
than those granted through the concessionary systems used in the
Middle East.21 The attractive terms prompted significant foreign investment from Britain and the United States propelling Mexico to
center stage in the world market. However, Mexico’s status as the
world’s
second-largest
oil
producer22
was short-lived.
Díaz brought massive foreign investment to fuel Mexico’s rapid
development, but his Darwinian approach to rule provoked political
and social unrest, watering the seeds of revolution.23 Díaz’s predatory
use of public domain laws enabled him to expropriate land from Mexican landowners and concentrate wealth among his supporters and
foreign investors.24 As economic conditions worsened, the foreign oil
companies were increasingly perceived as leeches, exploiting Mexican
resources and hoarding wealth while the populous suffered.25 Díaz
sought to maintain power by buying off would-be rivals26 and ruth-

18. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
19. Código de Minería de 22 de Noviembre de 1884, tit. 1, art. 10, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 26-11-1884.
20. Ley Minera de 4 de Junio de 1892, tit. 1, arts. 3-5, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 4-6-1892.
21. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13, 23-24, 27 (1989).
22. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
23. The Díaz regime “engineered the conditions that would lead to the
Revolution. . . . [And] opportunistically appropriated from Darwin’s recently published
theories, in ways that allowed the strong to prosper and the weak to serve.” William D.
Signet, Grading a Revolution: 100 Years of Mexican Land Reform, 16 L. & BUS REV. AM.
481, 493-94 (2010).
24. Public domain laws were used as a tool of oppression to rob Mexican landowners
and place eighty-seven percent of private landownership in the hands of one-fifth of one
percent of the population. Id. at 495.
25. Tomás Clayton, José Díaz-Guerro & José Garcia-Cervantes, Foreign Investment in
Mexico: Mexico Welcomes Foreign Investors, 12 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 13, 13-14 (1992).
26. Charles Wilson Hackett, The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 19101926, in WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION PAMPHLET SERIES 339, 340 (1926).
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lessly silencing his opposition,27 but soon revolution became inevitable.
The Mexican Revolution ended the Díaz regime and sought to establish public order by centralizing power.28 The government was
broke from revolution, and the wealthy oil companies were the most
logical targets. Mexico tried to move towards a concessionary system
with new petroleum laws to extract greater wealth from the oil industry. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 and The Petroleum Law
of 1925 vested natural resources ownership with the nation and created a concessionary system, which required oil companies to register
their rights in recognition of these principles.29 Oil companies resisted these changes and refused to pay rising taxes because of their
prejudicial retroactive effect.30 Resentment grew on both sides for
decades as the Mexican economy lay prostrate and famine broke out
as foreigners thrived.31 Tensions came to a head in 1938. President
Lázaro Cárdenas made the radical decision to oust the foreign oil
companies and expropriate the entire petroleum sector.32 Understandably angered at the outright seizure of long-enjoyed ownership
rights, the oil companies boycotted Mexican oil triggering Mexico’s
rapid fall from grace.33 After President Cárdenas’ decree allocated the
expropriated assets to Pemex as the only oil company in the country,34 Pemex became and remains an iconic national symbol of triumph against foreign intervention.35 Despite these successes, isolation from international markets and new technologies drove a steady
economic decline for the next twenty years.36
While still suffering these repercussions long after expropriation,
Mexico discovered Cantarell field, which was one of the largest discoveries in the world and remains Mexico’s largest discovery in history.37 Prices for oil more than doubled just as Mexico regained its sta27. Díaz even went so far as to jail one of his rivals during the election. Signet, supra
note 23, at 497.
28. BROWN, supra note 13, at 213.
29. Id. at 226.
30. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 21, at 29.
31. BROWN, supra note 13, at 213.
32. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 21, at 29-30.
33. Esperanza Durán, Pemex: The Trajectory of a National Oil Policy, in LATIN AMERICAN
OIL COMPANIES AND THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 145, 171-72 (John D. Wirth ed., 1985).
34. Historia de Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX, http://www.pemex.com/en/about-pemex/
history/Paginas/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3TP-ANJ5].
35. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
36. Christopher C. Joyner, Petróleos Mexicanos in a Developing Society: The Political
Economy of Mexico’s National Oil Industry, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63, 67 (1982).
37. Tim R Samples, A New Era for Energy in Mexico? The 2013-14 Energy Reform, 50
TEX. INT’L L.J. 603, 612 (2016).
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tus as a major oil producer.38 Pemex reached the pinnacle of its oil
and gas history ushering in a miracle era for Mexico with an exponentially rising GDP averaging 6.5 percent growth annually.39 Massive profits led to massive growth as Mexico significantly expanded
public spending and industrialized rapidly.40 The gap between the
standard of living in Mexico and the United States began to close.
Pemex’s success became a source of national pride because it was attained without the help or hindrance of foreign investment. The success story of Mexico garnered praise and was internationally hailed
as the preeminent model of economic development.41
Just as the sun appeared to shine so brightly for Mexico, crashing
oil prices focused the light on poor investment decisions and unsustainable financial imbalances. As prices plummeted, Mexico’s brief
flirtation with petroleum paradise came to a close; “[t]he miracle era
passed . . . and growth never recovered.”42 Simply put, Mexico failed
to plan for the long term. When oil prices were high, Mexico was able
to leverage its assets to borrow funding for development, but rampant overspending led to budget deficits, amplifying the financial imbalances of debt-fueled growth. Massive debt, the focus on short-term
production, and a glaring lack of adequate infrastructure investments left Pemex ill-prepared to succeed when the inherently volatile
oil prices inevitably fell.43 Many of these issues still inhibit Pemex’s
growth even after the monumental reform.
III. PRESENT CHALLENGES ADD URGENCY
Throughout its history, Pemex has been plagued by inefficiencies
and underperformance due to poor investment decisions, insufficient
infrastructure, exclusion from the world market, criminal activity,
and crippling tax burdens.44 Mexico’s economy is closely tied to
Pemex, which provides roughly one-third of total government revenues.45 Since 1998, Pemex has operated at a loss.46 Declining production and rising domestic consumption add urgency to the plea for
change. This Section will give an overview of the challenges Pemex
currently faces, some of which it has endured since its creation; oth38. EDUARDO BOLIO ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., A TALE OF TWO MEXICOS:
GROWTH AND PROSPERITY IN A TWO-SPEED ECONOMY 23 (2014).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. See Samples, supra note 37, at 622.
42. BOLIO ET AL., supra note 38, at 4.
43. Samples, supra note 37, at 614-18.
44. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-3.
45. BOLIO ET AL., supra note 38, at 23; Samples, supra note 37, at 614.
46. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.

1232

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1225

ers are more recent due to current global and regional economic conditions.
A. Old Problems That Refuse to Go Away
Pemex is often referred to as simultaneously existing as Mexico’s
“cash cow” and “sacred cow.”47 Cash cow refers to Pemex’s crippling
tax burden while sacred cow refers to its status as a symbol of nationalism and the corresponding restrictive legislative regime in
which it exists.48 These attributes conflict and have led to heavy losses despite an abundance of potential. Being a cash cow limits
Pemex’s ability to invest in its own future and this limitation is multiplied by legislative constraints on Pemex’s ability to invest.
1. Death by Taxes
The first part of the cash cow/sacred cow irony is the crippling tax
burden that bleeds Pemex dry. By comparison, Exxon Mobil is the
only energy company with larger pre-tax profits; however, after taxes, Pemex’s ranking drastically falls to 86th place.49 Pemex has historically been subject to high taxes, but more recently the numbers
have been astronomically high. Pemex’s taxes far surpass the industry average of 35 percent among integrated oil producers.50 In 2012,
“[t]he oil producer paid 99.5 cents for every dollar of the $71 billion in
pretax revenue.”51 Even with recent tax cuts, taxes are still overly
burdensome. In 2013, Pemex lost $13 billion despite $126 billion in
revenues.52 Mexico is heavily dependent on these taxes, which
amount to more than “total government spending on social programs,
education, and public health and safety.”53 Notably, without these tax
revenues, Mexico’s 2013 deficit would have been closer to 9 percent of

47. Tim R. Samples & José Luis Vittor, The Past, Present, and Future of Energy in
Mexico: Prospects for Reform Under the Peña Nieto Administration, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
697, 698 (2013); Samples, supra note 37, at 614.
48. Samples, supra note 37, at 614.
49. Id. at 615.
50. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Death of 99% Pemex Tax Soothes Oil Monopoly Fate: Mexico
Credit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2013, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0927/death-of-99-pemex-tax-soothes-oil-monopoly-fate-mexico-credit [https://perma.cc/EV6B-ML3F].
51. Id.
52. Samples, supra note 37, at 615.
53. Michael D. Plante & Jesus Cañas, ‘Reforma Energética’: Mexico Takes First Steps to
Overhaul Oil Industry, DALL. FED., https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/swe/
2014/swe1402g.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBE-43KF].
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GDP instead of 1.7 percent.54 All major parties have agreed that this
overt overdependence has inhibited growth and must change.55
2. Too Big to Win
The other side of Pemex’s dual existence is its role as the sacred
cow. Taxes prohibitively limit Pemex’s working capital. As Mexico’s
sacred cow, legislation significantly constrains the use of the remaining revenue crumbs. Private companies often treat underperforming
units like tree branches, cutting off dead branches for the overall
health of the tree. Mexican legislation took away this option for
Pemex: “As a virtual monopoly, Pemex was responsible for covering
all of Mexico’s hydrocarbon needs—upstream, midstream, and downstream—regardless of expertise or profitability.”56 This burden was
made heavier through the Petroleum Law of 1958, which expressly
prohibited Pemex from entering into standard risk-sharing horizontal agreements that based compensation on production levels.57 Thus,
Pemex was forced to fully shoulder the burden of risky ventures.
Practically, this has led to massive losses and forestalling opportunities to develop infrastructure and learn from corporations with greater experience in a particular area. For example, Pemex does not have
adequate refineries or transportation infrastructure so Mexico is
forced to import half of its gasoline.58 Likewise, even with all its reserves, limited pipeline capacity requires Mexico to import one-third
of its natural gas and turn to expensive liquefied natural gas imports.59 Strategic investments have been left by the wayside in favor
of short-term production as “Pemex has essentially been run as a
ministry of the government.”60 With greater outside foreign investment, Pemex could potentially solve these inadequacies and reduce
needlessly expensive imports.
B. New Problems
The challenges Pemex faced were remarkable. Pemex managed to
keep Mexico afloat for decades without international support despite
massive tax burdens and a restrictive legal environment.61 Unfortunately for Pemex, the problems did not end there. Domestic and glob54. Id.
55. Rodriguez, supra note 50.
56. Samples, supra note 37, at 617.
57. Ley Reglamentaria del artículo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petróleo, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-29-1958.
58. Samples, supra note 37, at 618.
59. Id. at 618.
60. Id. at 639.
61. See Samples, supra note 37, at 612-17.
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al market concerns piled more on Pemex’s ever-growing list of challenges. Domestically, rising energy consumption, declining production with elevated production costs, and an overall struggling economy created a significant hurdle for Pemex’s future. Internationally,
the oversaturation of the oil market and global oil crash created an
immediate threat to Pemex’s survival. Without reform, Pemex would
have inevitably failed and the repercussions for Mexico would have
been disastrous.
1. Domestic Concerns
Domestic concerns forced Mexico to face facts: the status quo was
unacceptable. Without drastic reforms, Mexico’s future was bleak.
Production has been in rapid decline over the past decade. In 2005,
production was 3.3 MMbbl/d (million barrels/day), but, by 2013, production fell to 2.5 MMbbl/d.62 The Cantarell field, which brought
Pemex to the peak of its history, is aging rapidly. In 2013, the Cantarell field accounted for only 17 percent of Mexico’s production as
compared with 63 percent in 2004.63 In addition to the Cantarell
field, approximately 80 percent of Mexico’s oil fields are in advanced
stages of production decline.64 Increasing domestic consumption exacerbates the problem of declining production. Some studies have suggested that Mexico may become a net importer of oil within the next
decade.65 Mexico is already a net importer of petroleum products, importing just about everything except oil.66 Mexico’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. The tax revenues from Pemex account
for more than one-third of governmental revenues and 11 percent of
Mexico’s economy.67 Replacing this critical revenue stream with a deficit would have disastrous effects on the Mexican economy. Pursuing
deepwater resources could turn the tide on declining production, but
Pemex simply does not have the resources or expertise to develop

62. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT NO. DOE/EIA-0484,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014: WORLD PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUID FUELS 16
(2014), http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/AXT9-BNBB].
63. Samples, supra note 37, at 612.
64. SECRETARÍA DE ENERGÍA DE MÉXICO, ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL DE ENERGÍA 20132027 41 (2013).
65. KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III & RONALD SOLIGO, RICE U. JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR
PUB. POL’Y, SCENARIOS FOR OIL SUPPLY, DEMAND AND NET EXPORTS FOR MEXICO 25 (2011).
66. Laurence Iliff, Oil-Rich Mexico Becomes Net Importer of U.S. Petroleum
Goods, W ALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304908304579562400748296622.
67. Juan Montes & Laurence Iliff, Mexico Outlines New Oil Sector Policies for
Private Firms, W ALL ST. J. (May 1, 2014, 9:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303948104579533790440136238.

2017]

OIL AND REFORM

1235

deepwater and other unconventional resources.68 Furthermore, rising
production costs severely limit the viability of pursuing costly deepwater exploration to counterbalance declining production.69 In light of
these factors, reform became critical for Mexico’s future.
2. Global Market
Foreign investment could bring the necessary resources and expertise to turn the tides on declining production, but attracting foreign investors is complicated by the current economic climate. Overproduction amidst waning demand created a global oil crash. Oil
prices are known to go through boom and bust cycles,70 but this price
drop was different. The recent bust was more than a market response
to fluctuating demand; it was the outgrowth of a fundamental shift in
the supply-demand balance.71 Oil is a volatile industry, and this volatility has had profound effects on Mexico’s economy.72 Although systemic problems sparked Mexico’s growing need for reform, the global
oil crisis dictated the timing.
New technologies disrupted the global oil market by unlocking
vast United States tight oil resources that were previously unattainable.73 Domestic oil companies flooded the market to develop the untapped resources and reduce reliance on imported oil.74 As the United
States sprinted towards energy independence, major world oil suppliers scrambled to compete for new buyers in an increasingly saturated
market.75 The United States, however, was not the only country reducing oil imports. Rising domestic production brought new suppliers
and altered market shares, but socioeconomic factors reduced the size
of the entire market. Emerging economies like China “have entered a
new, less oil-intensive stage of development.”76 Likewise, the global
economy, in general, has become less fuel dependent due to the globalization of the natural gas market, the development of renewable
energies, and climate change concerns that have altered energy poli-

68. Samples, supra note 37, at 613.
69. Jude Webber, Pemex Rises to the Challenge of Reinventing Itself, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
12, 2014, 6:50 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/973784ea-586a-11e4-a31b-00144feab7de.html
#axzz42eSLd6vx.
70. See, e.g., Luke J. Danielson, Sustainable Development, Natural Resources, and
Research, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 39, 40 (2004); Stephen Sewalk, Brazil’s Energy Policy and
Regulation, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 652, 658 (2014).
71. DELOITTE, OIL AND GAS REALITY CHECK 2015: A LOOK AT THE TOP ISSUES FACING
THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR 1 (2015).
72. See supra Part II.
73. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, OIL MEDIUM-TERM MARKET REPORT 2015, at 10 (2015).
74. Id.
75. DELOITTE, supra note 71, at 4.
76. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 73.
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cies.77 Japan, for example, has decreased its oil consumption by 22%
since 2000.78 The International Energy Agency reported that these
changed market conditions will impact how prices rebound, which
will stabilize “at levels higher than recent lows but substantially below the highs of the last three years.”79 This fundamental shift in
global oil trade economics has threatened OPEC’s market dominance,
forced oil companies to sell off assets, and added a high level of risk
for investors.80 Global suppliers have been forced to adapt. Likewise,
Mexico needed to change so Pemex could survive. Even with reform,
success was far from guaranteed, but reform was a necessary first
step.
IV. THE REFORM
This Part will discuss the major changes and key provisions in the
recent Reform of Mexico’s oil sector with an analysis of how they may
address Pemex’s current challenges. The newly increased autonomy
will bring both opportunities for success and challenges associated
with adjusting to a new legal framework with increased competition.
This Part will give a brief explanation of the legal framework and of
the Reform; analyze Pemex’s new role and how it fits into the new
system; and provide an overview of other notable provisions within
the Reform. Their future success will heavily depend on Mexico’s
ability to attract foreign investment and Pemex’s ability to adapt to
the new environment with the effective implementation of long-term
management strategies.
A. Legal Framework
Mexico’s recent, dramatic energy Reform took place in two major
phases. The first phase amended the constitution to remove the constitutional barriers to investment.81 Unhindered by constitutional
restrictions, the legislature passed a substantial amount of revised
legislation in August 2014, collectively known as the Secondary Legislation.82 The governing instruments relevant to the oil industry are
the new Hydrocarbons Law, the Hydrocarbons Revenue Law, the
Pemex Act, the Coordinated Regulatory Bodies Act, the Law on the
77. Id.
78. DELOITTE, supra note 71, at 4.
79. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 73, at 11.
80. See DELOITTE, supra note 71, at 4, 9.
81. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 27-01-2016; Samples,
supra note 37, at 624-25.
82. Antonio Borja Charles & Carlos de Maria y Campos, Oil & Gas 2015: Mexico,
LATIN LAW. (Mar. 3, 2017), http://latinlawyer.com/jurisdiction/1002906/mexico.
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National Agency on Safety and Environmental Protection in Hydrocarbons Matters, and the Foreign Investment Act.83 These instruments dramatically change the entire energy industry.
Mexico’s Secondary Legislation completely reorganizes the petroleum industry with the addition of new regulatory bodies and liberal
policies that permit foreign investment.84 The Secondary Legislation
created the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) and the National Agency on Safety and Environmental Protection in Hydrocarbon Matters (ASEA). It also allocates varying levels of regulatory and
oversight responsibility between the newly created entities and the
Ministry of Energy (SENER), the Ministry of Finance, and the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE).85 Broadly speaking, SENER and
CNH will approve the grant, transfer, and migration of entitlements,
as well as supervise compliance with their terms.86 They will also negotiate the technical aspects of E&E contracts.87 SENER and CRE
will also establish the permit regime and enforce regulatory compliance with them.88 The Ministry of Finance will work to negotiate the
fiscal terms in these agreements.89 ASEA will not take a direct part
in the formation of agreements; however, ASEA will establish the
regulations that govern them.90 Article 129 of the Hydrocarbons Law
gives ASEA authorization to issue regulation for industrial and operational safety, environmental protection, and sustainable development of the energy sector.91 According to an official statement, their
mission is “[t]o guarantee people’s safety and the environment integrity with legal, procedural, and cost-effectiveness certainty within the
hydrocarbons sector.”92 Together, these entities work to create and
oversee production agreements.

83. Id.; see also Ley de Hidrocarburos, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-82014 [hereinafter Ley de Hidrocarburos]; Ley de Ingresos sobre Hidrocarburos, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-8-2014; Ley de los Órganos Reguladores Coordinados en
Materia Energética, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-8-2014; Ley de Petróleos
Mexicanos, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-8-2014; Ley de la Agencia Nacional de
Seguridad Industrial y de Protección al Medio Ambiente del Sector Hidrocarburos, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-8-2014; Ley de Inversión Extranjera, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 27-12-1993, últimas reformas DOF 18-12-2015.
84. See generally Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83 (authorizing foreign investment
and detailing the authority of the new regulatory agencies).
85. Charles & Campos, supra note 8282.
86. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 6-10.
87. Id. arts. 32-35.
88. Id. arts. 48-50.
89. Id. art. 30.
90. Id. art. 129.
91. Id.
92. Frequently Asked Questions, AGENCIA DE SEGURIDAD, ENERGÍA Y AMBIENTE
http://www.asea.gob.mx/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ASEA-ENGLISH-1.2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2FZ-R25R].
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B. What Types of Agreements Can They Authorize?
The rights to conduct particular upstream activities are allocated
to state-productive enterprises (SPE) like Pemex and private parties
through Entitlements and Exploration and Extraction (E&E) contracts.93 This is a marked change from the prior regime, which only
permitted fee-based service contracts.94 This Part will discuss the
various agreements authorized by the reform as well as important
provisions common to every agreement. SENER and CRE allocate
rights to conduct upstream activities to both state-productive enterprises and private contractors. Entitlements give exclusive rights to
state-productive enterprises in a particular area or for a particular
project.95 E&E contracts give private contractors varying rights to
conduct upstream activities.96 The particular rights depend on which
of the four contractual models the regulatory agency chooses. These
broad options provide an enabling approach that is well suited to encourage investment in a wide variety of situations. “As a result, Mexico will go from being one of the most limited major jurisdictions for
energy investment to being among the more flexible.”97 The regulatory agencies’ options, and production agreements in general differ in
the ways they allocate risk and reward between the state and investor.
1. Entitlements
The first method of allocating rights in the upstream industry is
through Entitlements.98 An Entitlement is an exclusive right to conduct E&E activities.99 The Ministry of Energy will grant Entitlements on an exceptional basis to Pemex or any other state-productive
entity.100 In order for SENER to grant an Entitlement, the National
Hydrocarbons Commission must submit a favorable technical opinion.101 Such Entitlements may be renounced or transferred to another
SPE, but only with prior authorization from SENER.102 SPE may not
93. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 11-31.
94. Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 57.
95. MAYER BROWN, ANALYSIS OF MEXICO’S NEW HYDROCARBONS LEGAL REGIME 2
(Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/69fe7acd-ca5b-4d1c-a17231678b13ec06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/75b0fe83-d4a2-4523-b8e2-3f7ae78102a7/
UPDATE-Analysis-of-Mexicos-New-Hydrocarbons-Legal-Regime.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Samples, supra note 37, at 626.
98. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 11-31.
99. Id.
100. Id. art. 6.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 8.
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transfer Entitlements to private parties, but these parties are authorized to execute service contracts as long as consideration is cash,
not rights to a percentage of in-kind production.103 SENER will have
significant authority to oversee and revoke Entitlements.104
Traditionally, Pemex had the right to conduct these activities via
Entitlements; however, the new regime establishes more stringent
requirements and provides greater oversight. The Reform granted
greater autonomy to Pemex, but now Pemex has to deal with competition. In order to level the playing field, Pemex was granted
Entitlements through “Round Zero.”105 This internal bidding round
was essentially a right of first refusal for areas Pemex was currently
producing or actively exploring. Pemex submitted requests to retain
E&E rights to these areas. SENER determined which rights Pemex
would keep and which rights would be offered for public bidding
based on proof of Pemex’s financial and technical capacity to develop
the resource.106 SENER granted Pemex Entitlements to “100 percent
of PEMEX’s producing areas; 83 percent of Mexico’s proven and
probable reserves (2P Reserves); and . . . 21% of Mexico’s prospective
resources.”107 In effect, Pemex will still play a dominant role in Mexico’s E&E activity, but the door is now open for other players to step
into undeveloped areas. The goal is to stem declining production by
directing foreign investment towards undeveloped areas that Pemex
does not have the resources or technical capacity to develop effectively.108 Until now, Pemex had to shoulder the burden of the entire oil
industry. The Reform presents room to shift some of that burden to
foreign investors.
2. E&E Contracts
Entitlements are hydrocarbon rights directly granted to stateproductive enterprises.109 Foreign companies will not be given Entitlements. Foreign investors enter the process through E&E contracts.110 E&E contracts are production agreements that confer rights
to either state-productive enterprises or private contractors. These
contracts will be negotiated during a competitive bidding process that
CNH will conduct.111 The Reform outlines four contractual model
agreements to give the regulatory agencies wide discretion to choose
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. arts. 8-9.
Id. art. 10.
MAYER BROWN, supra note 95, at 1.
Samples, supra note 37, at 639.
MAYER BROWN, supra note 95, at 1-2.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 62, at 16.
Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 6-10.
Id. arts. 6-31.
MAYER BROWN, supra note 95, at 3.
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the appropriate model on a case-by-case basis.112 This Section will
analyze the structure of the agreements and some of their key provisions.
(a) Competitive Bidding
CNH will conduct competitive bidding rounds for E&E contracts
according to the technical and fiscal guidelines set by SENER and
the Ministry of Finance, respectively.113 SENER will select the contractual area, either on its own volition or upon recommendation
from Pemex or another state productive enterprise. SENER will work
with CNH to establish the technical prequalification criteria and
technical contract terms.114 The Ministry of Finance will establish the
fiscal terms for the contract and the bidding process.115 The bidding
process will begin when CNH publishes the call for bids in the Federal Official Gazette.116 The call for bids will detail the bidding requirements, award mechanisms, prequalification criteria, and provide a minimum of 90-days within which to submit bids.117 The bidding results will then be published in the Federal Official Gazette
and CNH will execute the contracts.118
(b) Structure of the Agreements
The bidding process will be fairly consistent, but the content and
structure of the agreement will differ on a case-by-case basis.119 The
Reform allows for significant flexibility to account for varying levels
of risk. Generally speaking, the two main types of production agreements are concessionary agreements and contractual agreements.120
Concessionary agreements grant the investor title to the hydrocarbons in consideration for a small state royalty.121 The investor has
considerable managerial control over production and carries the majority of production risk and reward. Under contractual agreements,
the investor receives a share of production, but the state maintains
112. Id. at 3-6.
113. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 11-13.
114. Id. art. 29.
115. Id. art. 30.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 23.
118. Id. arts. 23, 31.
119. Id. art. 29 (authorizing the Ministry of Energy to select the contract model that, in
its discretion, would provide the most economic benefit for Mexico).
120. See generally Bryan W. Blades, Production, Politics, and Pre-Salt: Transitioning to
a PSC Regime in Brazil, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 31, 33-34 (2011) (explaining the
primary features of the concessionary and production sharing contract models).
121. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 21, at 36-37.
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title; production risk is more evenly distributed and the state receives
a greater profit share.122 The government has a larger vested stake in
the project and, therefore, is more likely to directly participate and
control the project. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution reaffirms
that all hydrocarbons are owned by the state and specifically prohibits concessionary agreements. However, it significantly liberalizes
the industry by authorizing contractual agreements with productionbased compensation.123 The Reform creates four E&E contractual
models: (1) licenses; (2) production sharing contracts; (3) profit sharing contracts; and (4) service contracts.124 These options allow for
flexibility to encourage significant foreign investment but do not revert to the pre-1938 concessionary regime. This flexibility will be key
in attracting investors.
(1) Licenses
While concessionary agreements are explicitly prohibited, licenses
are essentially a more balanced, modern version of concessions.125
The use of the word license instead of concession is reflective of the
“[p]olitical sensitivities around concessions [due to] lingering memories of Mexico’s early history with foreign oil companies.”126 In fact,
this is not uncommon. The word “concession” still carries a negative
connotation reminiscent of early inequitable agreements. Bargaining
power shifted after the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and states started to receive better
deals with increasing royalties and more control over operational decisions.127 As agreements developed greater balance, the word “concession” has often been replaced with the label “license” even though
the underlying concessionary structure has remained intact.128 When
Mexico’s agencies opt for the licensing structure, the contractor will
own the hydrocarbons in-kind at the wellhead in consideration for
cash payments in the form of a signing bonus, exploratory phase fees
(analogous to United States rental fees), royalties, and a percentage
of the contract value of the hydrocarbons.129 Unlike pre-1938 concessionary agreements with ten percent royalties, Mexican licenses “will
likely land near the higher side of the industry standard range of fif122. Id. at 37-41.
123. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 27-01-2016; Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 11.
124. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 18.
125. Samples, supra note 37, at 627.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 627-29.
128. Id. at 627.
129. MAYER BROWN, supra note 95, at 3.
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ty to seventy-five percent.”130 Following the modern trend, Mexico
will retain more operational control, impose heightened minimum
work and investment obligations, and limit duration.131 Even with
better terms, licenses still give far more control to the contractor
than alternative agreements. This high-level of risk management allocation will likely be chosen for development in particularly risky
projects, like deepwater exploration.
(2) Production and Profit Sharing Agreements
As briefly discussed earlier, production agreements vary in their
allocation of risk. Production sharing agreements and profit sharing
agreements are similar to licenses in many ways. All three have the
same terms regarding exploratory phase fees and royalties and will
include similar minimum work and investment obligations.132 The
primary distinctions are the level of state control, national oil company participation, and the division of operating profits.133 These
agreements allocate risk and operational control more evenly than
licenses. Due to the greater vested interest, direct state participation
is more common in these agreements.134 As with licenses, exploratory
phase fees will be paid in cash, but royalties and operating profits are
apportioned differently. Royalties are paid in-kind, meaning Mexico
will receive a portion of the actual hydrocarbon production instead of
a cash payment.135 Operating profits are calculated after deducting
royalties and cost recovery.136 Cost recovery is a method of paying the
contractor back for the substantial investment and operating costs
involved in extracting hydrocarbons.137 After these costs are subtracted, Mexico will receive a percentage of the operating profits in-kind.
The only real difference between production sharing agreements
and profit sharing agreements is the form of payment to the contractor. In production sharing contracts, the contractor retains in-kind
production equivalent in value to recoverable costs and its share of
operating profits.138 In profit sharing contracts, Mexico keeps all the
production and gives the contractor cash payments for cost recovery
and its share of profits made on the sale of hydrocarbons.139 Produc130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Samples, supra note 37, at 627.
Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 19.
MAYER BROWN, supra note 95, at 3-6.
Id.
Samples, supra note 37, at 629.
Ley de Ingresos, supra note 83, art. 12.
Id. arts. 16-19.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 11(II)(b).
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tion sharing agreements are significantly more common in the global
oil industry,140 but the additional profit sharing model adds flexibility
that could potentially increase investment.
(3) Service Contracts
The last option available to Mexico’s regulatory agencies is a service contract model. Prior to the Reform, the Petroleum Law of 1958
only permitted “pure” service contracts.141 Under pure service contracts, companies perform a particular service for a fixed fee that is
independent of production results.142 The Reform now allows risk service contracts. Risk service contracts tie compensation with the results of production. The company performs the service and is only
compensated if production occurs. The exact terms vary, but compensation may be in-kind, a percentage of profits, or a preferential right
to purchase the oil.143 Depending on the terms, risk service contracts
become more or less comparable to production sharing agreements;
however, service contracts tend to be more limited in scope and duration.
(c) Key Provisions Applicable to All E&E Contracts
The Reform provides a flexible approach so the regulatory agencies will have wide discretion to choose the type of agreement that is
advantageous for Mexico while still attractive enough to draw in foreign investment. Many important contract terms regarding operational control and compensation will vary by the chosen contractual
model and particular case; however, key provisions of the Hydrocarbon Law ensure particular advantageous terms will be a part of every
E&E contract. These key provisions, “common to almost all international petroleum arrangements around the world. . . . [A]re national
content, tax and royalty structures, minimum work obligations, and
dispute resolution.”144 This Section will analyze these key provisions
in the Reform. The Reform sets required contract terms in these areas that are in line with international standards.145
(1) National Content
National content, in petroleum agreements, refers to particular
contractual obligations that are designed to “accomplish strategic
140.
141.
142.
143.

Samples, supra note 37, at 629-32.
Id. at 632-33.
Id.
ADRIAN LAJOUS, COLUM. UNIV. CTR. ON GLOBAL ENERGY POL’Y, MEXICAN ENERGY
REFORM 17 (2014).
144. Samples, supra note 37, at 634.
145. Id.
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goals for domestic industry.”146 The exact methods vary, but typical
obligations require a specified minimum percentage of national employees, investment in domestic infrastructure, preferential treatment for national products and services, and local training. The Reform combines all of those obligations into an overall “national content” formula: (National Content Goods + National Content Labor +
National Content Services + National Content Training + National
Content Technology Transfer + National Content Infrastructure) /
(Goods + Labor + Services + Training + Technology Transfer + Infrastructure) * 100 = National Content Percentage.147 The Hydrocarbon
Law requires a minimum national content percentage of 35 percent.148 The Law requires 35 percent as an average across the industry and provides that individual contractors must progressively
achieve a percentage determined by SENER.149 Additionally, the Hydrocarbon Law explicitly excludes E&E activity in deep and ultradeep waters from this requirement.150 This flexible, progressive approach strikes a good balance to provide local benefits without overburdening the contractor. Flexibility is key to avoid chilling investment, as evidenced by the poor results directly attributable to Brazil’s onerous national content requirements.151
Although perhaps not technically classified as “national content,”
the Hydrocarbon Law also helps build national expertise and
knowledge through required disclosures. The Law expressly states
the geological, geophysical, petrophysical, and petrochemical information, and in general the information, which is obtained or has
been obtained from surface surveying and exploration, as well as
E&E belongs to the nation.152 Contractors are required to deliver this
information to CNH. CNH will use this information to create and
manage the National Center of Hydrocarbons Information which will
collect, store, analyze, and publish this information subject to certain
time-limited confidentiality restrictions.153 This will help build Mexico’s practical knowledge and expertise as a result of each project.

146. Id. at 635.
147. MAYER BROWN, SUMMARY OF MEXICO’S PRODUCTION-SHARING CONTRACT TERMS FOR
SHALLOW WATER AREAS 9 (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/
31e8ee04-0bf4-4924-9917-91eb14df2512/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/59dca3bb-37914908-b493-067850d4881e/UPDATE-Mexico_Shallow_Waters_2014.pdf.
148. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, arts. 11-13.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Samples, supra note 37, at 635.
152. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 32.
153. Id. art. 35.
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(2) Minimum Work and Investment Program
While not listed as a mandatory requirement, the Hydrocarbon
Law envisions the likely inclusion of minimum work and investment
programs in E&E contracts.154 Similar obligations are standard in
petroleum agreements.155 Typically, contractors must commit to invest a specified amount of money and meet work benchmarks at particular intervals (e.g., $50 million required investment with at least
two exploratory wells completed within four years). The exact terms
will vary project-by-project, but the Round One minimum work programs averaged approximately $1 billion for each project.156 These
requirements serve to align the state and contractor’s interests to
work quickly towards production. This is reflective of risk-bearing
shifts as E&E projects develop.157 Before production, the state bears
the risk that the contractor will not efficiently manage resources or
drill and drop. As E&E projects get closer to the production stage, the
risk begins to shift onto the contractor. Once production has begun,
the risk is squarely on the contractor that the state will not honor the
contract. The contractor is protected, at least on some level, from illegitimate expropriation because such action would inflict significant
reputational damage on the state and the loss of future investment
opportunities. Minimum work programs help protect the state in the
pre-production phase. If the contractor drills and drops, the contractor will lose a significant amount of money. This heightened consequence serves to mitigate the state’s risk.
(3) Royalty and Tax Calculations
Perhaps the most important contractual provisions for the state
and contractor are the compensation provisions, which decide how
profits will be allocated. As with other provisions, Mexico has opted
for a flexible approach. Royalties vary based on market prices. If oil
prices are under $48/barrel, the royalty will be 7.5 percent.158 When
oil prices rise above $48/barrel, the royalty will be calculated according to this formula: [(0.125 * Contractual Price for Petroleum) + 1.5]
percent.159 An additional, vaguely worded provision provides Mexico
with an “adjustment mechanism” to capture “extraordinary returns.”160 It remains to be seen when and how Mexico may invoke
154. Id. art. 19.
155. Samples, supra note 37, at 634.
156. Id. at 634-35.
157. See generally Blades, supra note 120, at 38-41 (describing the features of typical
production sharing contracts and risk allocation).
158. Ley de Ingresos, supra note 83, art. 24(I)(a).
159. Id. art. 24(I)(b).
160. Id. art. 15.
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this provision. The rest of the fiscal terms are fairly straightforward.
Rental fees follow a common pattern: they are imposed on a “perkilometer” basis and increase as the project develops to encourage
effective resource management.161 Signing bonuses ensure that immediate state revenue will be decided on a case-by-case basis.162 E&E
activities are subject to the standard 30 percent corporate tax, which
compares favorably to the many countries that charge a higher tax
rate for E&E activities.163 Outside of the vague adjustment mechanism,
the fiscal terms are standard for the industry.164
(4) Dispute Resolution
Given the significant time and monetary investments for E&E
projects, dispute resolution forms a key part of E&E contracts. The
Hydrocarbon Law distinguishes between “administrative rescission,”
which will be handled in Mexican courts, and other disputes that
may go to arbitration.165 Administrative rescission effectively terminates the E&E contract upon the occurrence of “serious” circumstances, such as failure to comply with the minimum work commitment, serious accidents, or other serious breaches.166 The concern,
here, is the extremely broad nature of these serious breaches. It is
unclear how “serious” one of the listed occurrences needs to be for
Mexico to invoke administrative rescission. Other less serious
breaches may be covered by an alternative arbitration agreement. In
the model Round One production sharing agreements, arbitration
will be conducted in The Hague according to the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law’s rules.167 Notwithstanding
UNCITRAL or the chosen arbitral rules, all arbitration agreements
are adjusted to the following conditions in every case: (1) the applicable laws shall be Mexican federal laws; (2) they shall be conducted
in Spanish; and (3) the award shall be strictly at law and shall be
binding and final for both parties.168 The location and UNCITRAL
rules provide some stability and standardization to the arbitration

161. Id. art. 55.
162. Samples, supra note 37, at 637.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 636-37 (explaining how the corporate tax rate compares favorable to
other countries); see also Blades, supra note 120, at 38-41 (describing typical fiscal terms in
production sharing agreements).
165. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 20.
166. Id.
167. Contrato para la Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos bajo la Modalidad de
Producción Compartida, cl. 26.5, Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos [CNH-R01L01/A2/2015] 5-9-2015.
168. Ley de Hidrocarburos, supra note 83, art. 21.
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process; however, the administrative rescission exception may prove to
be extremely disconcerting for potential investors.
The Reform represents a radical departure from the state monopoly system. Some of the contract terms are problematic and their practical application will be discussed in Part V; however, the key takeaway from this analysis is flexibility. Mexico used to have zero flexibility.169 The Reform is a radical step towards liberalization. The Constitutional Reform created the possibility for foreign investment in the
oil sector. The Secondary Legislation gave the Reform some teeth.
The Secondary Legislation created new regulatory agencies and expanded the role of others. It created a transparent process, which allows for maximum flexibility so CNH can choose the contractual
model best-suited for a particular project. The key provisions, for the
most part, are in line with international standards. They will require
adjustment to maximize investor attractiveness; however, the Reform
is a monumental first step in Mexico’s path towards a liberalized energy sector.
V. MEASURED EFFECTS AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
The previous Section discussed the text of the Reform. This Section will discuss the realities of post-Reform implementation. Pemex
is struggling to adapt to the new environment and rid itself of lingering challenges. In order for Pemex to succeed, the promise of greater
autonomy and lower tax burden needs to become reality. Confronting
new challenges while remaining shackled with these old problems is
too great a task. These are certainly significant short-term concerns,
but appear attributable to both bad timing (market-wise) and the
natural growing pains of implementing such radical change. Likewise, the Mexican government has faced growing pains in attracting
investors. The first oil tender was a major disappointment; however,
the government learned from their mistakes and made adjustments
in the most recent oil tenders. The improvements had immediately
beneficial results in attracting significant investment. Despite recent
successes, there is still room for further improvement to minimize
investor risk and increase international competitiveness. When evaluating the future, this Note urges for cautious optimism. Many problems exist, but a realistic assessment could not have expected overnight success. On a whole, the Reform has been a success, just not an
overnight success. Reforming Pemex and attracting investors requires overcoming hurdles on many fronts to achieve balance. Mexico’s recent successes show the fruits of such efforts. These steady improvements are indicative of future growth and telling with regards
to the nature of current challenges. They are the growing pains of
169. See supra Part III.

1248

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1225

Mexico’s oil sector rebirth. They are hurdles to be overcome in the
short-term; meanwhile, in the long-term, the Reform promises to revitalize an ailing energy sector and provide economic growth.
A. Pemex
Part III of this Note discussed some of the major problems, which
historically have inhibited Pemex’s growth. The systemic problems
are the result of a crippling tax burden and a restrictive regulatory
environment. Declining production and a weak global market further
strained Pemex’s ability to make strategic investments. This Section
will discuss how the Reform has fared against these problems. The
Reform cannot make global oil prices rebound any faster but aimed to
correct Pemex’s systemic inefficiencies and turn the tides on declining production. In theory, these changes should help reduce Pemex’s
substantial burdens and generate higher profits. These changes certainly bring opportunity, but reengineering Pemex is a work in progress. The short-term outlook is negative; however, the Reform
should bring long-term gains for Pemex by reducing its historical
burdens.
1. Present Effects
Pemex, post-reform, is struggling. Moody’s Investor Service has
given Pemex a negative outlook rating in the short to medium term
because “oil prices remain depressed, production continues to drop,
taxes remain high, and the company’s capex needs are financed with
debt.”170
Pemex has always been hampered by an enormous tax burden and
a restrictive legal environment. The Reform promised lower taxes
and greater autonomy so Pemex could make strategic investment decisions and adapt to the new competitive environment. Overall, the
Reform has not yet had much of a positive impact on Pemex’s growth.
Pemex’s tax burden has declined but still remains high. Over the
next four or five years, taxes from Pemex are expected to contribute
over 20 percent of the government’s annual budget.171 High taxes
mean Pemex must use debt to fund capital expenditures. Over the
last three years, Pemex has increased its debt but has not achieved

170. Press Release, Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., Rating Action: Moody’s de Mexico Confirms
PEMEX’s ratings at Aaa.mx/MX-1; Changes Outlook to Negative, (Nov. 24, 2015)
(quoting Nymia Almeida), http://www.pemex.com/en/investors/debt/Calificacin%20crediticia/
Moody’s%20press%20release%20November%202015%20NSR_151124.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5Z2MDXS].
171. Id.
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sustained growth.172 Pemex has liquidity problems with record high
losses and massive debt.173 Production is still in decline and a weak
global market hinder profitability.174
Likewise, Pemex was promised greater autonomy, but the government still exerts too much influence on Pemex’s operations. Conceptually, Pemex has been transformed into an entirely different entity. “The productive state enterprise model is a theoretical departure
from the ‘ministry’ approach of past governance: Pemex will have
greater latitude to place a greater emphasis on generating profits.”175
Historically, Pemex’s board of directors was composed entirely of political appointees so corporate decisions were often politically motivated and unduly focused on short-term gains.176 The Reform eliminates political appointments altogether, creates stricter requirements
to ensure independent directors, and modernizes the board’s structure.177 The Reform gives Pemex significantly more administrative
and budgetary autonomy178 to choose its projects and focus on strategic long-term gains. This is certainly a welcome change but does not
go far enough. Pemex’s investment decisions are constrained by annual Congressional approval with regards to its maximum borrowing
threshold and net financial balance.179 This control must be lessened
for Pemex to be able to focus on long-term gains instead of short-term
political goals.
2. Challenges Present Opportunity
Lingering systemic problems weigh heavy on Pemex as it adapts
to a new regulatory regime in a competitive environment. The timing
of these radical changes could not have been much worse.180 Implementation began just as global oil prices started free falling. Weak
172. Id.
173. Adam Williams, Pemex Hits 13th Straight Loss with $9.3 Billion Decline, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 29, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-29/pemex-cuts-5-5billion-in-spending-projects-as-losses-mount [https://perma.cc/97EP-5GHS].
174. Erik Schatzker & Jose Antonio Gonzalez Anaya, Pemex CEO Says Reform, Transparency May Lead to IPO, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016, 9:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
videos/2016-04-20/pemex-ceo-says-reform-transparency-may-lead-to-ipo [https://perma.cc/3GUE88UE].
175. Samples, supra note 37, at 640.
176. Id.
177. Ley de Petróleos Mexicanos, arts. 20-21, 40-45, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 11-8-2014.
178. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 62, at 16.
179. Press Release, Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., supra note 170.
180. Adam Williams, That Didn’t Work as Planned: Mexico’s Oil Monopoly Ends, Then
Oil Tanks, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0222/that-didn-t-work-as-planned-pemex-monopoly-ends-then-oil-tanks
[https://perma.cc/Q56K-E733].
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global demand, depreciation of the Mexican peso, and declining production magnify Pemex’s struggles to restructure.181 Despite significant current challenges, the Reform presents opportunities for increasing Pemex’s profitability and long-term growth.
Pemex needs to reckon with the reality of low oil prices and make
strategic decisions accordingly. Although the tough economic climate
presents a significant challenge, the pressure may turn out to be
beneficial in the long-term. Low oil prices are forcing Pemex to make
serious budget cuts and drastically improve efficiencies. Learning to
thrive in the worst of times will prepare Pemex for future success. In
the 1970s, the opposite occurred. Pemex had major success in a highprice environment, but mismanagement left the company in dire
straits when the market crashed.182 Now, Pemex finds itself in the
opposite situation by being forced to increase efficiency to survive the
low-price environment. The Reform accords Pemex tremendous flexibility to adapt and thrive. Pemex’s new CEO, Jose Antonio Gonzalez
Anaya, noted how Pemex seeks to take advantage of the Reform’s
opportunities.183 Until now, Pemex had to completely shoulder the
risk of the entire oil sector. Post-Reform, Pemex has the opportunity
to refocus. Anaya explained that Pemex will be selling off assets, particularly non-strategic downstream assets.184 By selling off nonstrategic assets, Pemex can increase revenues and efficiency for longterm, sustainable profitability. Beyond selling assets, Pemex now has
the opportunity to make strategic partnerships. Pemex no longer is
forced to shoulder the burden of the entire industry. For so long,
Pemex was isolated. Now free from this isolation, Pemex needs to use
strategic partnerships to build its own expertise and increase efficiency.
Pemex has a tough road ahead. There is a lot of history to overcome and Pemex is struggling to overcome it. Overnight change,
simply, was an unreasonable expectation. Despite challenges, the
Reform offers Pemex with many ways to adapt and make strategic
decisions. Pemex is mired in debt and the global market is weak.
With time, a refocused Pemex will be able to increase revenues to
fund strategic investments without raising its debt ceiling. Mexico
has given some support to help Pemex manage its debt.185 While this
181. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 50 (describing the challenges Pemex faces
from Mexico’s high debt and depreciation of the peso).
182. See supra Part II.
183. Erik Schatzker & Jose Antonio Gonzalez Anaya, supra note 174.
184. Id.
185. Nacha Cattan, Adam Williams & Eric Martin, Pemex Gets Tax Break and $1.5 Billion
Relief to Tackle Debt, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2016, 12:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-04-13/pemex-to-get-1-5-billion-from-government-to-reduce-record-debt.
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will certainly help in the short-term, Pemex’s long-term success will
depend on how it uses its newfound flexibility. The new CEO appears
prepared to confront these challenges head-on and use the Reform to
break ground.
If Pemex can take advantage of the opportunity to reduce risk and
refocus on strategic profit-focused decisions, Pemex will be a vastly
more profitable and efficient business.
B. Foreign Investment
A basic tenet of economics is investors need to be compensated for
their risk.186 Competitive offers require a sufficiently attractive balance of risk and reward.187 The oil market, specifically, is an inherently risky business venture. When investors look at an opportunity,
they compare the venture-specific risk with the fiscal terms. At its
core, venture-specific risk is composed of geographical risks (will this
block produce oil?), legal risks (what are my contractual rights, and
will I be able to enforce them?), and country-specific risks (will political strife, criminality, or other country-specific problems have an effect
on this venture?). Countries increase competitiveness with attractive
fiscal terms and risk-minimization. Becoming and staying competitive is a complex balancing act. This Section will analyze Mexico’s
recent post-Reform attempts at reaching this balance and discuss
how Mexico can adapt to minimize risks and maximize benefits.
1. Bidding Results
The first bidding auction after the Reform was marked by disappointment. CNH placed fourteen blocks for bid, but only awarded two
blocks.188 CNH commissioner, Juan Carlos Zepeda, acknowledged the
results fell well below expectations of awarding four to five blocks.189
Prohibitively high minimum bids, tough contract terms, and the lowprice oil environment contributed to the poor results. CNH only received six bids but threw out four for not meeting the minimum requirements.190 Some analysts point to CNH’s lack of discretion as a
major hindrance in completing deals with the bids. For example,
CNH was not allowed to negotiate or accept an offer below the undisclosed minimum government take of 40 percent operating profit.191 If
186. The Reality of Investment Risk, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/realityinvestment-risk [https://perma.cc/B2LK-ZNNE].
187. Id.
188. Velda Addison & Leslie Haines, Round One in Mexico Disappoints, OIL & GAS
INV’R (July 15, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www.oilandgasinvestor.com/round-one-mexicodisappoints-810076#p=full [https://perma.cc/3UGH-9GZ7].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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CNH had sufficient discretion to negotiate, they may have achieved a
deal at a slightly lower profit percentage. This certainly seems preferable to arbitrary rejection.
Although the first bidding auction did not generate the results
hoped for, Luis Videgaray Caso showed optimism about the success of
the round to establish confidence in Mexico’s ability to conduct a
transparent bidding process. He explained that this was just a first
step and Mexico will have to analyze the market to adapt effectively.192 The government made good on this promise and made numerous improvements for subsequent rounds. The improvements led to a
very successful third auction, which surpassed expectations, particularly in light of continuing low oil prices. The third auction resulted
in awards for all twenty-five onshore exploration fields offered for
bidding.193 Altogether, this will bring in an expected $1.1 billion of
investment over the next twenty-five years.194 This is a remarkable
change in such a short period. Despite improvements, certain policy
choices and country risks, if left unaddressed, may derail future bidding rounds and will not maximize benefits for Mexico.195
2. Fiscal Terms
Overall, Mexico has created fiscally attractive terms for investors,
as proven by recent successes; however, Mexico could improve fiscal
competitiveness in its bidding process.196 Mexico has demonstrated
an “excessive focus on rent collection . . . rather than a focus on broad
based development of a wide range of Mexican oil and gas resources.”197 This was quite evident with the strict minimum government take in the first auction. The focus of the bidding formula needs
to be expanded to give more consideration to the amount of work to
be performed. Otherwise, less promising blocks will go undeveloped.
Blocks that are less geographically desirable cannot be expected to
fetch the same price as others. When Mexico foreclosed the possibility
192. See Licitación para Explorar Hidrocarburos Fue Buen Primer Paso: Videgaray, EL
FINANCIERO (July 16, 2015), http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/licitacion-paraexplorar-hidrocarburos-fue-buen-primer-paso-videgaray.html [https://perma.cc/X7CM-FB4R]
(“Esta licitación del día de ayer es un paso, es un buen primer paso pero es apenas un primer
paso . . . . Habremos de analizar y aprenderde las lecciones de esta primera licitación del día
de ayer, escuchar el mensaje que nos está dando el mercado.”).
193. Patrick McGee, Mexican Oilfield Auction Thrives Despite Low Prices, F IN.
T IMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.ft.com/fastft/2015/12/16/mexican -oilfield-auctionthrives-despite-low-prices.
194. Id.
195. See infra Section V.B.2-4.
196. PEDRO VAN MEURS & J. JAY PARK, PARK ENERGY L., REPORT ON PROPOSED MEXICO
MODEL CONTRACT AND BID CONDITIONS FOR THE ONSHORE BID ROUND 17 (2015).
197. Id. at 2.
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of making a deal based on an undisclosed royalty minimum, Mexico
left value on the table. Now those blocks will not be developed. This
is an economic waste for both Mexico and investors. Additionally, undue focus on royalty percentage leads to over-bidding, which will create future problems between the government and investor. 198
3. Legal Risk
Legal risk comes from contractual and regulatory uncertainty. Investors want to know what their rights and liabilities are and how
those will be enforced. More unknowns mean more risk. Mexico has
made significant improvements to the contractual rights, but uncertainty still exists. On the other side of the coin, unclear regulations,
inexperienced regulatory agencies, and corruption concerns pose
enforcement-related risk.
(a) Contractual Uncertainty
Mexico has made significant improvements to the competitiveness of its contract terms. Mexico appears to be on the right path, but
additional changes could improve competitiveness by limiting excessive governmental discretionary decision-making power. Such discretion, particularly in the contract’s termination clauses, pose risk to
investors and potentially opens the door for corrupt behavior.199 The
termination clauses grant CNH too much power to terminate the contract for specified, relatively non-serious breaches. For example,
CNH may terminate the contract after any delay of 180 days in implementing any work program.200 The termination clauses also permit
termination for failure to file proper reports and other administrative
violations.201 Termination is a nuclear remedy, which should be reserved for more serious contract breaches and violations. Additionally, the only recourse is through Mexican courts. As it stands, these
clauses give the government too much discretionary power. The potential for abuse poses significant risks, thereby reducing international competitiveness.
(b) Regulatory Uncertainty
Regulatory uncertainty poses additional legal risk to potential investors. The Reform created new regulatory agencies and expanded
the roles of others. “Judicial and regulatory authorities lack experi198. Id.
199. Id. at 19.
200. Contrato para la Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos bajo la Modalidad de
Producción Compartida, cl. 22.4, Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos [CNH-R01L01/A2/2015] 5-9-2014.
201. Id.
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ence in oversight of a competitive energy sector, a factor further complicated by the implementation of a still evolving regulatory regime.”202 Given the new and evolving nature of the Reform and its
regulatory authorities, many regulations lack clarity and investors
cannot be sure if their rights will be protected or how compliance will
be enforced. Massive allegations of fraud in Pemex and consistently
low country ratings in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index pose additional enforcement-related risk.203 Experience and regulatory clarity will come with time as the agencies develop and adapt to the new competitive environment. These are
prominent concerns, but they are short-term concerns. Corruption is
the more salient long-term issue. Despite anti-corruption measures,
corruption is still disconcertingly prevalent.204
4. Country Risk
Perhaps, the biggest country-specific risk is criminality. Pipeline
tapping is a cause of major concern for investors. Pemex provided
statistics showing criminal groups tapped pipelines, stealing over $1
billion in hydrocarbons between 2012 and 2013.205 Carlos Elizondo, a
board member at Pemex, explained cartels pose a major source of
worry to potential investors: “I’m afraid oil companies coming to Mexico will have to worry about insecurity as much as about drilling.”206
The enormous black market for oil has triggered an exponential rise
in pipeline tapping.207 Pipeline tapping is not the only issue. Kidnapping and extortion have been on the rise as well. “A 2013 survey by
the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico found that on average, foreign investors allocated around 4 percent of operating costs to
security . . . .”208 The offshore oil sector may avoid many of these problems, but the onshore violence will still be a source of concern, particularly for transportation.209 President Nieto created a new security
framework, which has had some notable successes in preventing or202. Mexico: Security, Corruption Remain Key Threats to Oil and Gas Investment, PGI
INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://pgi-intelligence.com/news/getNewsItem/Mexico-Securitycorruption-remain-key-threats-to-oil-and-gas-investment/601.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Juan Montes & Dudley Althaus, Drug Cartels Will Challenge Energy Investors,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mexican-drug-cartelspose-challenge-to-energy-investors-1418936709.
206. Id. (quoting Carlos Elizondo).
207. Caryn Livingston, Mexico: Land of Energy Opportunity, Crime Risk, OIL & GAS
INV. (May 7, 2015, 9:32 AM), http://www.oilandgasinvestor.com/mexico-land-energyopportunity-crime-risk-794736#p=full [https://perma.cc/37SC-PM2T].
208. PGI INTELLIGENCE, supra note 202.
209. Id.
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ganized crime.210 Efforts to lower violence are ongoing and have shown
some promise, but security will remain a prominent investor concern
for the foreseeable future.211
Since the Reform, Mexico has shown the competence to implement
a transparent bidding process. Early disappointments led to marked
improvements. These changes pave the way for a promising future,
but significant challenges remain for Mexico to be internationally
competitive and best serve its own long-term interests. To increase
competitiveness, Mexico needs to be open to better fiscal terms for
less geographically desirable blocks and reduce legal risk by limiting
opportunities for abuse.212 Mexico has made great strides to minimize
contractual uncertainty but could create more competitive terms by
eliminating excessive discretionary agency powers. Inexperienced
agencies and evolving regulations pose short-term hurdles, which
will likely lessen as Mexico adapts to the newly liberalized market.
Corruption, however, poses a greater long-term threat. Previous anticorruption measures have been relatively fruitless. Eradicating corruption is likely an unrealistic goal (certainly not a short-term goal),
but limiting regulatory discretion and establishing clear enforcement
guidelines will go a long way in easing investors’ concerns. Like corruption, criminality is a long-term problem. Mexico will need to address investors’ security concerns to increase competitiveness. Looking towards the future, Mexico appears to be confronting these challenges head-on in efforts to achieve the right balance of risk and reward to attract investors. Recent successes show these efforts are
paying dividends. Balance does not come overnight, and Mexico will
continue to struggle with growing pains, but the post-Reform future
looks promising.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mexico has abundant potential, but years of market isolation left
Mexico woefully short from realizing it. The Reform is a radically
powerful step towards reaching that potential, but change is not
easy. Early bidding rounds have not lived up to expectations; however, credit must be given for the herculean reform efforts that brought
Pemex out of its monopolistic entrenchment into the modern oil market. The Reform is “the most important economic change in Mexico in
210. KATHRYN HAAHR, WILSON CTR., ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OF THE OIL
INDUSTRY: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NORTHEASTERN MEXICO AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSES 14-15 (2015) (explaining how Nieto’s new security strategy has been used to
arrest narco-traffickers and disrupt cartel activities).
211. PGI INTELLIGENCE, supra note 202.
212. Cocaine, Guns and Oil Investors Weigh Mexico Risks, CNBC (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/06/cocaine-guns-and-oilinvestors-weigh-mexico-risks.html
[https://perma.cc/7KDN-QMF7].
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the last 50 years.”213 While a necessary change, the Reform, alone, is
insufficient. Pemex must disentangle itself from the government’s
lingering hold, modernize its structure, and adapt to the new market
and regulatory environment. Mexico needs to develop its newly created entities to generate income in diverse areas of the industry. Additionally, Mexico needs to encourage investment by minimizing investor uncertainty with clear regulations, attractive contractual
terms, and effective action against criminal interference. This is no
easy task. Mexico’s initial predictions were, perhaps, overreaching.
Current predictions are cautiously optimistic. Even with the stated
need for reservations, growth is expected as early implementation
efforts adapt to the learning curve. The timeframe for this growth is
difficult to predict due to the radical nature of the Reform. Pemex’s
creation through expropriation was equally radical, but decades
passed before Pemex brought Mexico back to the forefront of major
global oil producers. The landmark Reform was instantaneous, but
its effective development took time and it was not all positive. Mexico’s radical oil Reform triggered rising tensions that escalated the
urgency for more radical change. Perhaps, this second constitutional
one-eighty will follow the same pattern. Hopefully, Mexico will learn
from the past and tackle present challenges thereby achieving strategic long-term growth. If so, this radical Reform could end the cycle
instead of becoming, yet another, piece in the tumultuous history of
oil and reform a la Mexicana.

213. MÉXICO: PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA, supra note 14 (quoting President Nieto).

